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Abstract
This paper studies the incentives for rms competing in vertically di¤erentiated markets to sign
binding collusive agreements, as in the case of mergers and alliances. Empirical investigations
show that rms involved in mergers and acquisitions revise prices and qualities as to maximize
their joint prots. In a few cases merging rms are also observed shutting down some lines
of activities (so called market pruning). In this paper we attempt to test these predictions by
modelling a three-stage game in which, at the rst stage, three rms selling goods independently
in a vertically di¤erentiated market can commit to sign either a full or a partial voluntary
agreement (with a subset of rms) via a sequential game of coalition formation while, at the
second and third stage they can optimally revise their qualities and prices, respectively. In
such a setting we study whether some binding agreements (as full or partial mergers) can be
sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game. Moreover, we analyse
the nal e¤ects of di¤erent coalition structures on equilibrium qualities, prices and prots
accruing to rms. We obtain the following results: (i) initial rms heterogeneity appears
a crucial factor for mergers to arise; (ii) although protable, the grand coalition of rms
(i.e. the whole market merger) is not the outcome of the nite-horizon negotiation, where
only partial mergers arise; (iii) all stable mergers comprehends the rm producing the bottom
quality good; (iv) all stable mergers reduce the number of variants on sale (market pruning);
(v) stable mergers always increase the quality gap among variants. All model ndings seem
compatible with the existing empirical observations.
Keywords: Vertically Di¤erentiated Markets, Mergers, Merger Policies, Cannibalization,
Market Pruning, Endogenous Coalition Formation, Price Collusion, Grand Coalition, Coalition
Stability, Core, Sequential Game of Coalition Formation.
JEL Classication: D42, D43, L1, L12, L13, L41.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the incentives for rms competing in vertically di¤erentiated markets to sign
binding collusive agreements, as in the case of mergers and alliances. Empirical investigations
show that rms involved in mergers and acquisitions usually revise prices and qualities, as
to maximize their joint prots.1 In many cases the companies involved in mergers also shut
down part of their product lines (so called market pruning).2 These possibilities are explicitly
considered by the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) when stating that:
Enhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price terms and conditions that
adversely a¤ect customers, including reduced product quality, reduced product variety,
reduced service, or diminished innovation.(U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2010). 3
Only recently the complex interaction between mergers and price-quality combinations has
started to attract attention (among the others, Mazzeo 2002, Crawford and Shum 2006, Gandhi
et al. 2008, Draganska et al. 2009, Chu 2010, Byrne 2012, Fan 2013, Lee 2013). For instance,
Berry and Waldfogel (2001) found that the series of mergers followed to the 1996 Telecommu-
nications Act drastically reduced the number of stations but increased the relative number of
varieties of formats available. Sweeting (2010) and George (2007) reported similar evidence for
U. S. radio music industry and Fan (2013) for U.S. newspapers market.4 For airline industry,
Peters (2006) observed a reduction of ight frequency on segments where merging carriers are
competing against each other, whereas Mazzeo (2003) showed that carriers deteriorate their
on-time performance as result of a less competitive after-merger market structure.
To the best of our knowledge, a full-edged study of the e¤ects of mergers on market prices
and qualities in a vertically di¤erentiated industry has not yet been provided. Similarly un-
explored is the analysis of mergers stability between rms in vertically di¤erentiated markets
when rms can re-shape prices and qualities of all products once merged. On this ground,
anecdotal evidence shows that frequently mergers and acquisitions occur among rms selling
1See, for instance, Berry and Waldfogel (2001) and Sweeting (2010) for an analysis of mergers in radio music
industry, George (2007) and Fan (2013) for US newspapers, Giraud-Heraud et al. (2003) for mergers occurred
in the mineral water market and Peters (2006) and Lee (2013) for those in US airline industry.
2A top cited case is Apple withdrawing from the market its i-phone 5 when marketing its enhanced smart-
phone i-phone 6. See also Johnson and Myatt (2003) for a detailed description of pruning by an incumbent as
e¤ect of an entrant in the market.
3For an analysis of recent US antitrust trials in which quality issues arise see, for instance, McMillan
(2015).
4 In particular, using data on the assignment of reporters to topical areas at 706 newspapers in the US, George
(2007) observes that di¤erentiation increases with ownership concentration. Sweeting (2010) nds instead that
those rms that buy competing stations tend to emphasize "service di¤erentiation" among themselves.
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products which are fairly di¤erentiated along the quality spectrum. For example, most of
mergers that took place after the deregulation of U.S. airline market in 1979 occurred between
one big national/international carrier and one low fare local carrier (e.g. the merger between
American Airlines and AirCal in 1986 or between Delta and Atlantic Southeast Airlines in
1999)5 or, alternatively, among intermediate-quality carriers (as for Southwest Airlines and
AirTran Airways in 2010).6 The European Airlines industry similarly experienced a high num-
ber of mergers among highly di¤erentiated airlines as, for instance, those between Air France
and Air-Inter in 1999 or between Lufthansa and Air Dolomiti, started in 1993 and concluded in
2003.7 In a similar way, the automobile industry is plenty of examples of premium segment car
producers absorbing economy automobile manufacturers, as in the merger between Volkswagen
Group and Skoda in 1991 or between BMW and Rover in 1994.8 The main consequences of
these consolidation processes are often which to re-position the lower quality brand towards a
higher segment of the market as well as, in some other cases, to un-brand intermediate quality
products to create a ghting brand able to compete more aggressively with the rms positioned
at the bottom of the quality spectrum. However, the latter strategy appears more as a tempo-
rary strategy, since a ghting brand can incur the risk to cannibalize the market of the merging
rms. This could be one reason why Lufhtansa decided to sell its share of the low-cost airlines
Condor in 2006. Ultimately, a consolidated group can nd more advantageous to re-brand its
economy products rather than un-brand some of its intermediate quality outlets. Instead of
letting Mini Cooper competing in the low segment of the market, BMW preferred to transform
this city car into a premium car. In a similar vein, the boom of mergers recently observed in
pharmaceutical industries, involving top pharmaceutical companies acquiring generics drugs
manufacturers (as in the recent case of Teva absorbing Allergan Generics), may represent a
similar trend.9
To study all these issues, in this paper we introduce a simple framework in which three rms
initially selling three vertically di¤erentiated products have to decide whether to merge or not
5A complete list of U.S. airlines industry mergers is available at: http://www.airlines.org.
6Other mergers between medium and small airlines are also those between Republic Airways and Midwest
Airlines in 2009, Republic Airways and Frontier Airlines in 2010 and many others. Such a long series of mergers
nally turned the U.S. Airlines industry into a quadriopoly between Delta, United Airlines, Southwest and
American Airways which, together, control more than 80% of the passenger capacity.
7 In some other cases the low-cost carriers have attempted to take over small-medium companies, as in the
recent hostile takeover launched by Ryanair to Air Lingus.
8Also the purchase in 1964 by Volkswagen of Auto Union (later known as Audi) from Daimler-Benz was
mainly due, at that time,to the production of economy cars by Auto Union.
9See, for instance, Jen Wieczner (2015), The real reasons for the pharma merger boom, Fortune, July 28,
2015.
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with all or with part of the rival rms. Once merged, rms are allowed to optimally reshape
their qualities and prices according to the new market structure. Thus, taking into account all
alternative price-quality equilibrium congurations, we study whether full or partial mergers
can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game. Moreover, we
analyse the nal e¤ects of di¤erent coalition structures on equilibrium qualities, prices and
prots accruing to rms.
In the remaining of this section we briey review some of the existing literature on collusion
and mergers under vertical di¤erentiation and present in more detail our paper content.
1.1 Related Literature
The relationship between collusive agreements and vertical product di¤erentiation was formerly
analysed by Hackner (1994). In his work, the key question is whether price collusion is more
likely to arise when products are close substitutes or, rather, highly di¤erentiated. In a duopoly
setting, he nds that monopoly pricing is easier to sustain in markets in which products are
similar. Further, he proves that the incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement is always
stronger for the high-quality rm. The main reason is that when the quality gap between
products is signicant, the prot of the top-quality rm is already high under no collusion,
so that its incentive to collude is weak. As the quality gap decreases and the noncooperative
payo¤ become smaller for the high-quality rm, reaching a collusive agreement gets more and
more attractive. Along the same research line, Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) study how the
stability of price collusion in a duopoly setting is a¤ected by the introduction of a minimum
quality standard. They observe how the introduction of a welfare-maximizing minimum quality
standard makes collusive agreements more di¢ cult to sustain. This is because the existence
of a standard decreases product di¤erentiation by providing the bottom quality rm with a
stronger incentive to break the agreement.10
There are two common traits in these works. First, (i) the degree of product di¤erentiation
does not change after a coalition has formed, since the collusive behavior is restricted to
pricing. The former assumption is a natural entry point in the literature on cartel stability
under product di¤erentiation, as it enables to disentangle the e¤ect of quality gap on the
stability of a cartel. Further, conceiving collusion in terms of pricing is particularly reasonable
in a short-run perspective. Still, it leaves unexplored a companion question, namely the e¤ect
10 In Hackner, the opposite holds since, due to the cost structure, in his model the asymmetry in prots gives
an advantage to the high quality rm.
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of the cartel on product di¤erentiation. This analysis is particularly pregnant in a long-run
perspective since one cannot exclude that in a more extended time span a coalition (typically
a cartel or a merger) entails structural changes, such as relocations of production facilities, or
adjustment in the product range and quality.
Secondly, (ii) the market is populated by two rms so that it turns out to be fully mo-
nopolized by a grand coalition in the case of cooperation between rms.11 While considering
at the start a duopoly enables to detail the e¤ects of a full cooperation, casual observations
show that, there exist circumstances under which rms choose to form a partial alliance (i.e.
one including a subset of rms in the market) rather than the grand coalition. While in any
partial alliance, colluding rms compete against some rivals outside the coalition so that a
noncooperative behavior is still preserved. Of course, a priori the e¤ects of a partial alliance
or merger are not equivalent to those observed when all agents collude and mimic a monopolist.
None of the above mentioned contributions focusses on the e¤ect of collusion in vertically
di¤erentiated markets.
To the best of our knowledge, the possibility that rms cooperate both along a price
dimension and a quality dimension in a vertically di¤erentiated market has been investigated
only by Lambertini (2000). He studies how the cartel stability is related to R&D activity in a
duopoly with convex costs, and assumes that the collusive quality choice can occur either under
price or quantity-setting behaviour.12 The issue concerned with the alliance formation when
more than two rms are active in a vertically di¤erentiated market is however still unexplored,
like so the impact of partial collusion on the market equilibrium. The introduction of an
intermediate quality rm sheds light on some interesting features of the coalition formation
process. As far as we know, the only model of vertical di¤erentiation with three independent
rms competing in quality and price is provided by Scarpa (1998).13 Considering the role of a
minimum quality standard, Scarpa (1998) stresses that the demand level of a rm in a vertically
di¤erentiated market depends on quality and price of adjacent rms in the product space. This
property, reminiscent of a spatial competition approach, is rather interesting when considering
the rationale adopted by the colluding rms to dene the optimal range of variants. Indeed,
since only adjacent variants compete against each other, under partial collusion dening the
optimal set of products to market requires to put in balance the cannibalization e¤ect that a
11The grand coalition is the one formed by all rms in the market.
12A di¤erent strand of literature considers the possible impacts of R&D joint ventures on product market
collusion. See on this, Martin (1995) and Lambertini et al. (2002).
13Pezzino (2010) analyses quantity competition among three rms in a vertically di¤erentiated market.
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variant produced by the coalition may exert within the coalition with the possibility that this
variant steals consumers from the rival rm (henceforth stealing e¤ect).14
Other closely related papers are those by Lommerud and Sorgard (1997), Gandhi et al.
(2008), Chen and Schwartz (2013) and Brekke et al. (2014), all devoted to the analysis of
price-quality post-merger re-positioning.15 The rst paper is inspired by Salant et al. (1983)
and Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and it is devoted to evaluate the protability of a merger
under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. The authors assume that the market is ini-
tially populated by three rms and, therefore, two rms can merge and decide on the number
of brands to market. When the xed cost of marketing a brand is high, the merged entity
reduces its product range. This increases the protability of mergers both under Bertrand
and Cournot competition due to reduced marketing costs. With a low cost of marketing,
the e¤ect on the product range depends both on the nature of competition and on the de-
gree of product di¤erentiation. For example, under Cournot or Bertrand competition and
su¢ ciently di¤erentiated products, the non-merging rm nds protable to introduce a new
brand, thereby damaging the merged entity. In order to highlight the impact of a merger
on non-price competition, Gandhi et al. (2008) assume that rms can instantaneously and
costlessly reposition their products after a merger, thereby choosing both price and location in
a Hotelling market. They show that after a merger the products are repositioned away from
each other to reduce the resulting cannibalization e¤ect. Consequently, non-merging substi-
tutes are repositioned between the merged products and, after all these location strategies, the
merged rms incentive to raise prices decreases. Similarly, in a Hotelling framework, Chen
and Schwartz (2013) analyse the incentive for rms to introduce a product innovation when
proposing a merger-to-monopoly. In contrast to Arrows nding for process innovation, where
the monopolist never undertakes R&D e¤orts to innovate, in this paper the incentive to invest
in incremental product innovations can be higher for the merged entity (a monopolist) than
for a rival facing competition from the existing good. Indeed, the monopolist can coordinate
the pricing of the two products overcompensating the erosion of prots coming from cannibal-
ization. In a spatial competition model à la Salop with three ex ante identical rms, Brekke et
14These e¤ects resembles the so called peer e¤ect and pecking order e¤ect. The peer e¤ect takes place when
joining organization with high-quality agents increases the payo¤ of its members. This e¤ects explains why
outstanding researchers tend to join top research department. On the other hand, the pecking order e¤ect takes
place when the payo¤ an individual gets depends on his/her relative position in a ranking. Typically, people at
the top in the pecking order have a greater chance to obtain further internal promotions.
15Other recent papers by Mazzeo (2002), Einav (2003) and Seim (2006) focus on the price-quality startegies
decided by industry entrants. These models are particularly relevant for the analysis of the strategic behaviour
of ex ante symmetric rms deciding their price-quality positioning (see on this, the discussion of Section 4).
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al. (2014) show that any two-rm merger reduces its product quality whereas the non-merging
rm responds increasing its quality. Final prices can either increase or decrease according to
the responsivness of demand functions. Moreover, it is shown that if a merger entails the
closure of one of the two merged rms, it always leads to higher qualities and prices for all
rms in the market.
1.2 Our Paper
In the present paper we consider a vertically di¤erentiated setting in which three rms initially
produce three vertically di¤erentiated products as independent rms. In this environment,
we study their incentives to sign full or partial binding agreement among rms, knowing in
advance that the formed alliances can manipulate collusively their quality-price combinations.
More specically, we introduce a three-stage game where, at the rst stage, every rm
expresses its willingness to form an alliance or, alternatively, to play as singleton. An alliance
can either contains all rms in the market (grand coalition) or a subset of them (two rms
colluding against the third one playing alone). As in Bloch (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohra
(1999) we assume that the coalition formation game is sequential, with an exogenous order of
play. Di¤erently from them, we assume that every rm proposes not only an alliance, but also
a division of the coalition joint payo¤.16 Each recipient of the proposal can either accept or
reject the o¤er and, in case of rejection, it becomes its turn to make a proposal. The game
is assumed nite-horizon and every rm only possesses one turn of proposal in each period.17
Once a coalition structure has formed, at the second stage rms decide simultaneously the
optimal quality of their products. When considering this issue, we take into account how a
full or partial merger among rms may a¤ect their incentives to di¤erentiate products in the
market. Choosing the optimal quality after colluding, in turn, a¤ects their incentives to merge.
Finally, at the third stage, rms set simultaneously prices. When in an alliance, quality and
price are set so as to maximize the joint prots of rms which belong to it. Notice also that,
when merging, rms can choose at the second stage (resp. third stage) to produce a quality so
low (resp. to quote a price so high) that no consumer is willing to buy it. This is equivalent
to stop producing the variant, thereby reducing the range of products sold at equilibrium.
16Bloch (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) assume identical players and a xed allocation rule within
each coalition. See also Belleamme (2000) for an extension of the model to the formation of asymmetric
alliances, and also Bloch (2002, 2003), Marini (2009) and Currarini and Marini (2014) for extensive surveys on
alliance formation models applied to oligopoly.
17Both Blochs (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohras (1999) models are, instead, innite-horizon. Our assump-
tions are meant to describe an environment in which the time of negotiation is quite limited in each period.
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We nd that, although the full monopoly merger would arise in an innite-horizon sequen-
tial game of coalition formation, under a nite horizon the incentive for rms to enter the full
market merger is always dominated by that to form partial coalition structures (partial merg-
ers). Furthermore, we prove that all equilibrium mergers always contains the bottom quality
rm which, in all cases, drops its low-quality variant from the market. In particular, whoever
is the additional player included in coalition (either the intermediate or the top quality rm),
equilibrium prices and qualities always coincide with that observed in the case of a duopoly,
with a high-quality rm competing against a low-quality rival, as in Motta (1992). At rst
sight, this result seems to be counterintuitive. A natural conjecture when considering that
players producing di¤erent variants collude is that either the range of variants or the quality
gap between variants in the market changes with the players involved in the alliance. We
nd on the contrary that only prots accruing to the single players change with the type of
partial merger, range of products, quality gap and price being unchanged. Indeed, the canni-
balization e¤ect and the stealing e¤ect induce the merger, whatever its members, to withdraw
from the market the lowest quality variant between the set which can be produced a priori.
Interestingly, depending on the intensity of these e¤ects, in some circumstances this variant
is withdrawn from the market at the price stage, in some other circumstances at the quality
stage. In particular, the merger formed by the intermediate quality and by the low-quality
rm stops immediately to market the bottom-quality product at the price stage. In contrast,
the merger formed by the top and the bottom-quality rm keeps the bottom product (as a
ghting brand) at the price stage whereas ultimately drops it at the quality stage. As argued
above, keeping a ghting brand in an alliance is mostly a short-run (price) than a medium/long
run strategy (quality) and it is, therefore, dropped when the merging group can re-position its
product lines. Finally, we nd that, in all equilibrium (partial) mergers, the bottom-quality
rm is always present. This appears in line with numerous theoretical and experimental studies
on coalition formation in triads of heterogeneous individuals, i.e. possessing di¤erent skills or
ghting ability (e.g. Caplow 1956, 1959, 1968, Vinacke and Arko¤ 1957, Gamson 1961). A
central conclusion of these studies is that weakness is strength(see, for instance, Mesterton-
Gibbons et al. 2011, p.189), with this meaning that less-powered individuals have usually more
chances to be part of a coalition. We obtain the same result with the rms competing in a
vertically di¤erentiated market. Here the main reason to merge with a lower quality rm is to
soften competition.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey introduces the paper setting.
Section 3 describes in detail the various equilibrium market congurations, the noncooperative
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case,18 the fully collusive case and all di¤erent cases of partial collusion. Section 4 characterize
all equilibria of the alliance formation game. Section 5 briey concludes. Most of the proofs
are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The Model
As mentioned in the introduction, rms are assumed to play a three-stage game: (i) an alliance
formation (sub)game (stage 1) assumed sequential; (ii) a market (sub)game including a quality
stage (stage 2) and a price stage (stage 3). The next section is devoted to introduce the alliance
formation game.
2.1 The Coalition Formation Game
Our game of coalition formation occurs at the rst stage of the game. Following Bloch (1995,
1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) we model the process of coalition formation as a sequential
unanimity game in which, in an exogenous order, rms propose to their rivals an alliance to
which they also belong.19 The rm which follows in the given order among those receiving the
proposal may, in turn, either accept or reject it. In case of acceptance, the turn passes to the
subsequent rm in the proposed alliance according to the exogenous order and, if all proposed
rms accept, the alliance is irrevocably formed and its members can decide cooperatively
qualities and prices. If, alternatively, one of the rms rejects the o¤er, it becomes its turn to
make a proposal and the game continues with the same logic until a given coalition structure of
the rms is obtained. Di¤erently from Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) and following
Selten (1981) and Chatterjee et al. (1993) we let the allocation rule be part of the bargaining
process.20 Specically, when it is its turn to o¤er, a rm proposes both an alliance and a
division of the alliance prot among its members. A second di¤erence between our game
and Blochs (1995, 1996) is that rms are ex ante heterogeneous, since when they enter the
negotiation they are independently producing three vertically di¤erentiated variants, denoted
high (H), medium (M) and low (L). The third (and most drastic) distinction of our game
with respect to Blochs (1996) and Ray and Vohras (1999) is that, in our case, the alliance
formation game is a nite-horizon game in which every player can make at most one proposal
at each period. This means that once a rm has proposed an alliance and has been rejected,
18Part of this analysis is also contained in Scarpa (1998).
19To be formed, an alliance needs the unanimous agreement of all participants (hence, unanimity game). As a
result, a player can always remain independent by simply declaring the coalition only containing himself/herself.
20The same assumption is also made in Moldovanus (1992).three-player coalition formation game.
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it can enter an alliance in that period only if it is proposed by another rm and it accepts,
remaining singleton otherwise. Our coalition formation game describes a limited negotiation
process in which the order of play can become crucial for the nal outcome. For this game, we
look at the proles of strategies which are subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We will discuss
below the implications of all our assumptions.
Formally, our alliance formation game is a triple G =
 
N; fi;igi2N

, with player set
N = fL;M;Hg, strategy set i and payo¤ i () :  ! R. For every rm (player) i 2 N , a
strategy i 2 i denes the actions ai 2 Ai available at each node (or information set Ii 2 Ii)
in which it is its turn to play. In our game, an action for a rm i 2 N can either be an element
of the set fYes, Nog coming in response to another rms proposal pj with j 6= i or, in turn, a
proposal pi = (S;) including an alliance S  N to which i belongs to and a division  2 RjSj
of the alliance joint prot S , such that
P
i2S i = S . Thus, for a rm a strategy i 2 i is a
mapping from its information sets to the set of its feasible actions Ai available therein, namely,
f(Ii) : Ii ! Ai, where Ai 

2Nn f?g ;RjSj

[ fYes,Nog

, with the property that, in every
period, a proposal pi 2

2Nn f?g ;RjSj

can be made by a rm only if, when it is its turn
to play, there are no other playersproposals on the oor and the rm itself has not already
made a proposal. That is, for every rm i 2 N the action available at every information set Iti
is ai(Iti ) = pi if both pj(I
t
j) = ? for j 6= i and pi(fIi g<t) = ? for any previous information
set, and ai(Iti ) 2 fYes,Nog otherwise. Note that every strategy prole  = (H ; M ; L) of G
induces an outcome O () = (C () ;()), namely a coalition structure C 2 C and a prole
of payo¤s  = (H ;M ;L) assigned to rms in C. The payo¤ of every rm i(p(v)) 2  is
obtained by associating to each coalition structure C a price-quality equilibrium prole p(v)
which will be described in Section 3. As last step, we need to dene a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPE) of the alliance formation game and, accordingly, a notion of stable coalition
structure.
Denition 1 A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) of the alliance formation game is a
strategy prole  such that, for every rm i 2 N , for every proper subgame G0  G, and for
every i 2 i, i
 
i ; 

 i
  k  i;  i.
Denition 2 A coalition structure C 2 C (a partition of the N rms) is stable if and only if
it is sustained by a SPE of the alliance formation game, namely, C = C().
Once again, it is important to mention that the outcome of the game would be completely
di¤erent if the rms were ex ante identical, i.e. they would no possess any pre-assigned quality
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level. In this case no merger would arise and all rms would remain independent producing
three vertically di¤erentiated goods, as at the starting point of our coalition formation game.
So, at least in this respect, our game is consistent. We will discuss the implications of this
point in the section devoted to the results of the alliance formation game (cfr. Section 4).
2.2 The Market
To keep things simple we adopt the well known specication of Mussa and Rosens (1978) model
of a vertically di¤erentiated market. In particular, we assume an uncover market initially
populated by three rms, i = H;M;L selling three vertically di¤erentiated goods, denoted
vH ; vM ; vL with vH > vM > vL:21 Also, for every i, vi 2 [0; v], where v 2 R+ is the highest
quality level which is technologically feasible.22 There exists a quality specic xed cost, say
ci =
1
2v
2
i : Consumers are indexed by  which is uniformly distributed in unitary interval,
with density function denoted f ().23 The parameter  captures consumerswillingness to
pay (henceforth WTP) for quality: the higher , the higher the corresponding WTP. Each
consumer can either buy one variant or not buying at all. Formally, consumersutility can be
written as
U() =
(
vi   pi if she/he buys variant i
0 if she/he refrains from buying.
From the above formulation, the consumer indi¤erent between buying variant i and not
buying is:
i =
pi
vi
;
while the consumer indi¤erent between buying variant i and i+ 1 is:24
i =
pi   pi+1
vi   vi+1 :
Of course, since qualities are endogenously dened at stage 1, the demand function for
rms when producing vH , vM ; and vL can be written, respectively, as:
21Since the market is always endogenously uncovered in the case of a monopolist, the assumption of uncovered
market, that some of the consumers refrain from buying goods, appears in our model as the most natural one
(cfr. Section 3.3).
22We share this assumption on the quality interval with Wauthy (1996).
23Considering an interval [0;m] simply leads to the addition of a parameter on which prices, quantities and
quality levels depend linearly, with no substantial changes in the payo¤ structure (see, for istance, Scarpa 1998).
24We easily deduce the expression of the indi¤erent consumer from: UL() = UM () and UM () = UL()
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DH =
1Z
H
f()d = (1  H) ;
DM =
HZ
M
f()d = (H   M ) ;
DL =
MZ
L
f()d = (M   L) ;
and, the corresponding prot functions are:
H =

1  pH   pM
vH   vM

pH   1
2
v2H (1)
M =

pH   pM
vH   vM  
pM   pL
vM   vL

pM   1
2
v2M (2)
L =

pM   pL
vM   vL  
pL
vL

pL   1
2
v2L: (3)
3 Equilibrium Analysis: Prices and Qualities
Since the whole game is solved backward, we can start characterizing the two nal stages of
the game. In particular, we rstly present the benchmark case of the analysis, that is the case
in which all rms decide noncooperatively prices and qualities (noncooperative equilibrium);
secondly, we turn to the case in which the grand coalition of rms has formed and they can
jointly decide prices and qualities (full collusion); nally, we look at what happens when rms
form intermediate coalitions (partial mergers). Since prices are usually more easily adjusted
than qualities, it is reasonable to assume that rms dene qualities at the second stage (quality
stage) and set prices at the third one (price stage).
The game is solved by backward induction. So, we consider rst the price stage under the
assumption that qualities have been xed. Then, we move to the quality stage.
3.1 Noncooperative equilibrium
In this section, we briey summarize price and quantity equilibrium obtained when the three
rms compete in the market against each other, while referring the interesting reader to Scarpa
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(1998) for further details. We assume that at the rst stage, no collusive agreement has been
reached so that rms decide their quality and then their price in a fully noncooperative fashion.
3.1.1 Price stage
At the price stage, given that costs are xed, we can study the noncooperative price behaviour
of the three rms by simply characterizing their revenue functions in the quality spectrum: (i)
top quality H, (ii) intermediate quality M and (iii) bottom quality L.
Thus di¤erentiating (1), (2) and (3) w.r.t pH, pM and pL, respectively, we can easily derive
all rmsbest-replies as:25
pH(pM ) =
1
2
(pM + (vH   vM )) ; (4)
pM (pH ; pL) =
1
2
pH(vM   vL) + pL (vH   vM )
vH   vL (5)
and
pL(pM ) =
1
2
pM
vL
vM
: (6)
As stressed by Scarpa (1996), the best-reply function of a rm depends on the quality and
price of the rm itself and of its neighboring rivals, while products that are farther away in the
product space do not play any role. From the above, equilibrium prices pi at the price stage
are obtained as:
pH(vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
2
(vH   vM ) (4vMvH   vLvH   3vLvM ) 
4vMvH   vLvH   2vLvM   v2M
 (7)
pM (vH ; vM ; vL) =
(vH   vM ) (vM   vL) vM 
4vMvH   vLvH   2vLvM   v2M
 (8)
pL(vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
2
(vH   vM ) (vM   vL) vL 
4vHvM   vHvL   2vLvM   v2M
 ; (9)
with corresponding prots
H(p
(vH ; vM ; vL)) =
1
4
(vH   vM ) (vHvL   4vHvM + 3vLvM )2 
v2M + vLvH   4vMvH + 2vLvM
2   12v2H (10)
M (p
(vH ; vM ; vL)) = v2M
(vH   vM ) (vM   vL) (vH   vL) 
v2M + vLvH   4vMvH + 2vLvM
2   12v2M (11)
25Firmsprot functions (1)-(3) are strictly concave in their respective prices.
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L(p
(vH ; vM ; vL)) =
1
4
vL (vH   vM )2 (vM   vL) vM 
v2M + vLvH   vM4vH + 2vLvM
2   12v2L; (12)
where p = (pH ; p

M ; p

L) denote the Nash equilibrium prices of rms obtained at the price
stage (stage 3). Let us now consider the choice of qualities by rms.
3.1.2 Quality stage
In order to characterize the Nash equilibrium quality choices occurring at the second stage, it
su¢ ces to maximize payo¤ function (10), (11) and (12) w.r.t. quality vH ; vM ; vL, respectively,
thereby getting:26
vH = 0:2526; v

M = 0:0497; v

L = 0:0095: (13)
Moreover, the corresponding subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prices p(v) and protsi(p(v)),
for v = (vH ; v

M ; v

L), are immediately obtained as:
pH(v
) = 0:10601; pM (v
) = 0:00912; pL(v
) = 0:0008; (14)
and
H (p

H(v
)) = 0:02348; M (pH(v
)) = 0:00124; L (pH(v
)) = 0:00005: (15)
3.2 Mergers
By denition a collusive binding agreement can either involve the set of all rms, denoted
N = fH;M;Lg (grand coalition) or, alternatively, any other nonempty subset S  N of them,
with S 2 N , where N = 2Nn? is the set of all nonempty coalitions of the N rms, in this case
simply:
N = (fHg ; fMg ; fLg ; fH;Mg ; fH;Lg ; fM;Lg ; fH;M;Lg) :
Thus, while if the rms form the grand coalition they commit irrevocably to jointly set qualities
and prices so as to maximize the sum of all rmsprots (full cooperation), in the second
scenario (partial collusion), a smaller subset of rms jointly decide qualities and prices, again
irrevocably, so as to maximize the sum of their own prots, while competing against a rival(s),
if any. In general, we can describe any type of (full or partial) rm collusion or noncooperative
26 It can be easily checked that all rm second-stage prot functions are strictly concave in their own qualities.
In what follows,for ease of exposition, we truncate our numerical results to ve decimals.
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behaviour by simply indicating the coalition structure C = (S1; S2; :::; Sm) representing a
collection of rms in alliances having null intersection and summing up to N , with m  n.
The set C of all coalition structures C that can be formed by the three rms is, therefore,
simply given by:
C = ((fHg ; fMg ; fLg) ; (fH;Mg ; fLg) ; (fHg ; fM;Lg) ; (fH;Lg ; fMg) ; (fH;M;Lg)) :
The game is solved backward so that we rst analyse the price and then the quality stage
under the assumption that either the grand coalition or any other intermediate coalition struc-
ture have formed at the rst stage. After the full characterization of market equilibrium in
any of these cases, we wonder which type of collusion (if any) will prevail in equilibrium.
3.3 Full Collusive Agreement
Let us assume that, at the rst stage, rms have formed the grand coalition. In the following,
we consider the price and then the quality decision.
3.3.1 Price stage
When the grand coalition fNg forms, at the price stage each rm maximizes the sum of all
rmspayo¤s (1)-(3) for arbitrary levels of the quality chosen at the second stage. Thus, by the
price maximization of the joint payo¤ of the grand coalition, the rm fully-collusive optimal
replies pcL; p
c
M and p
c
H are obtained as
pcH(pM ) = pM +
1
2
(vH   vM ); (16)
pcM (pH ; pL) =
pH(vM   vL) + pL (vH   vM )
vH   vL ; (17)
and
pcL(pM ) = pM
vL
vM
: (18)
By solving the system (16)-(18), a fully collusive optimal prices prole pfNg(v), for v =
(vH ; vM ; vL), is obtained as:
p
fNg
H (vH) =
1
2vH ; p
fNg
M (vM ) =
1
2vM ; p
fNg
L (vL) =
1
2vL: (19)
Given the above prices, the market share of any rm at the price stage, turns out to be:
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DH
 
pfNg(v)

= 12 ; DM
 
pfNg(v)

= 0; DL
 
pfNg(v)

= 0: (20)
It is immediate to see that, at the prices selected by the grand coalition, consumers are
willing to buy only the top quality variant vH , the demand for the intermediate and bottom
variants being nil. Accordingly, the prot accruing to the grand coalition at the price stage
are
fNg(pfNg (v)) =
1
4
vH   1
2
v2H :
3.3.2 Quality stage
In order to fully characterize the behaviour of the grand coalition, we can easily nd its optimal
quality, given by vfNgH = 0:25, so that prot obtains as:
fNg

pfNg(vfNg)

= 0:03125: (21)
The logic underlying this nding has been well described by Mussa and Rosen (1978):
Serving customers who place smaller valuations on quality creates negative externalities for
the monopolist that limit possibilities for capturing consumer surplus from those who do value
quality highly. (p.306).27 Rather interestingly, this nding does not depend on the initial
assumption on the market coverage. Indeed, even if one would develop the above analysis under
the alternative assumption that the market is covered, still at the price-quality equilibrium the
grand coalition would o¤er only the top-quality, while serving half of the market.
Finally, it is worth remarking that, under a full collusive behaviour, the level of prices
is, for all rms, always higher than under Nash equilibrium. This can be easily checked by
the following simple reasoning: (i) Start with the Nash equilibrium price of rm H and let the
remaining rms responding using their optimal collusive replies (16)-(17). (ii) Since comparing
(4)-(5) with (16)-(17) it turns out that optimal cooperative replies are twice as sloped as the
noncooperative best-replies and both upward sloping, as e¤ect of (i) all Nn fHg rms will
increase their prices. (iii) Let now also rm H respond cooperatively using its cooperative
27Further discussion on this result are provided by Gabszewicz et al. (1982) and by Gabszewicz and Wauthy
(2002) under the assumption of zero quality costs. Along the same research line, Acharia (1998) shows that
when the cost for quality improvement is not too convex, a multiproduct monopolist o¤ers only the top variant
among the ones which a priori can be sold in the market. Indeed, if the costs are not so signicant, o¤ering
the top variant only allows rms to escape from the cannibalization e¤ect which would take place if the more
than one variant would be saled at equilirium. Finally, Lambertini (1997) analyses the Mussa-Rosens model
with quality specic variable costs under the alternative assumption of full market coverage and partial market
coverage.
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optimal reply (18) and, as a result, it will increase its price. (iv) By continuing the adjustment
process of all rms along their collusive optimal replies, since these are all contraction mappings
(due to the inequality vH > vM > vL), a new price prole pfNg will be reached with the property
that pfNg  p, where p is the corresponding prole of noncooperative Nash equilibrium
prices.
3.4 Partial mergers
In this section we analyse all market congurations arising when partial mergers take place
among rms. We characterize three di¤erent market scenarios occurring, in turn, under the
following coalition structures: (i) CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), (ii) CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg) and,
nally (iii) CHM;L = (fH;Mg ; fLg).
Before computing in detail prices and qualities of rms under partial mergers, note that
from (1)-(3) when either the bottom quality rm or the top quality rm collude in prices
with their direct competitor, i.e. the intermediate quality rm, they just behave as in the
fully collusive case, with optimal replies given by (16) and (18), respectively. On the other
hand, when bottom and top quality rms form a coalition, due to the structure of the vertical
di¤erentiation model, they set prices exactly as in the noncooperative case, with optimal
replies given by (4) and (6). Thus, under a partial merger only the price behaviour of the rm
producing the intermediate quality variant vM (henceforth denoted intermediate rm) varies
according on whether it is allied either with its left (lower quality) or with its right (higher
quality) competitor. In particular, when the intermediate rm coordinates its price with its
left competitor, its rst-order condition implies
@M
@pM
+
@L
@pM
=
2pL   2pM
vM   vL +
pH   2pM
vH   vM = 0;
whereas, when it coordinate its price with its right-competitor, it sets pM such that
@M
@pM
+
@H
@pM
=
pL   2pM
vM   vL +
2pH   2pM
vH   vM = 0:
As a result, the optimal reply of the intermediate rm, plcM (pL; pH) in the left-partial (resp.
prcM (pL; pH) in the right-partial) merger writes as
plcM (pL; pH) =
pL(vH   vM ) + 12pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL) (22)
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(resp. prcM (pL; pH) =
1
2pL(vH   vM ) + pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL) ). (23)
3.4.1 Partial merger between the intermediate and the bottom quality rm
We consider initially the scenario where at the rst stage a merger has occurred between rm
M and rm L, with rm H playing as singleton against them. We assume, as a start, that
variants vM and vL are produced by the colluding rmsM and L, respectively. FirmH, outside
the collusive agreement, produces the high quality variant vH . We need to check whether this
quality assignment remains optimal at the equilibrium.
Price stage As coalition structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) forms, prices pH ; pM and pL
set by rms 1, 2 and 3 at the price stage can be obtained through the maximization of the
following objective functions
H =

1  pH   pM
vH   vM

pH
M +L =

pH   pM
vH   vM  
pM   pL
vM   vL

pM +

pM   pL
vM   vL  
pL
vL

pL:
Using (4), (18), and (22), the following optimal replies are obtained, respectively as,
ppcH (pM ) =
1
2
(pM + (vH   vM ))
ppcM (pH ; pH) =
pL(vH   vM ) + 12pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL)
ppcL (pM ) =
vL
vM
pM :
Therefore, the following equilibrium prices are set by rms:
p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H (v) =
2vH (vH   vM )
4vH   vM ;
p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
M (v) =
vM (vH   vM )
4vH   vM ;
p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
L (v) =
vL (vH   vM )
4vH   vM ;
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where v = (vH ; vM ; vL), with corresponding prots:
H(p
(fHg;fM;Lg)(v)) = 4
v2H (vH   vM )
(4vH   vM )2
  1
2
v2H ;
M (p
(fHg;fM;Lg)(v)) =
vH (vH   vM ) vM
(4vH   vM )2
  1
2
v2M ;
L(p
(fHg;fM;Lg)(v)) = 0:
Note that in this case the price of the low quality variant is set so high that no consumer is
willing to buy this variant and, therefore, DfM;LgL = 0. Thus, rm L ceases to be active in
the market: selling the bottom-quality variant would determine a cannibalization e¤ect within
the coalition since variant vL would be in competition only with the adjacent product vM .
Of course, it still plays a role in the coalition as the decision to stop producing benets the
coalition as a whole.28
Quality stage Then, moving to the quality stage and using the best reply functions, it is
immediate to see that top variant and intermediate variant are, respectively,
v
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H = 0:25331; v
(fHg;fM;Lg)
M = 0:04823: (24)
Given the above values, we can easily nd the equilibrium prices as
p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H = 0:10766; p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
M = 0:01025; (25)
and the corresponding equilibrium prots:

(fHg;fM;Lg)
H = 0:02443; 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
fM;Lg = 0:00152: (26)
It is easy to see that, at equilibrium, rm H continues to produce the top quality while
coalition fM;Lg sells the intermediate quality only. Note also that the above ndings coincide
with those emerging, for instance, in Motta (1992) where only two rms compete in a traditional
duopoly setting. Indeed, coalition fM;Lg behaves like a multiproduct rm: since it withdraws
from the market one of its variant, it is as if only two single-product rms would be active in
the market, each of them setting noncooperatively their quality and price. We resume these
results in the next proposition.
28 Its role will be claried at the alliance formation stage.
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Proposition 1 When the intermediate and bottom quality rm merge against the top quality
rm (playing as singleton), namely under coalition structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), at the
price stage colluding rms set a price so high for the low quality variant that no consumer is
willing to buy it. Thus, at the price-stage only two variants are marketed and the equilibrium
conguration in terms of quality and price coincides with that occurring in a traditional duopoly
setting.
Proof. It directly follows by expressions (24) and (25) and by their comparison with results
obtained, for instance, in Motta (1992).
Finally, it is worth remarking that this merger benets both the merging rms and the
rival H which plays as a singleton. Indeed, not only the lowest quality variant is dropped out
from the market, but also the gap between variants in the market is now larger than the one
emerging in the noncooperative setting with three independent rms: under partial collusion,
the optimal quality of the intermediate variant is lower (and the top quality higher) than
the corresponding levels set noncooperatively. This relaxes price competition between rms,
thereby increasing the resulting prots.
3.4.2 Partial merger between the top and the bottom quality rm
Let us move now to the case in which at the rst stage rms H and L have merged, whereas
rm M plays as singleton. As usual, we have to verify whether this quality assignment holds
at the SPE.
Price stage To obtain the optimal prices decided by the merging rms H and L and by rm
M alone, we need to take into account the fact that colluding rms H and L maximize the sum
of their prots H+L, whileM is only concerned with its own prot function M . However,
since rm H and L are not direct price competitor and are separated by rm M , at the price
stage their equilibrium prices and prots coincides with those obtained in the noncooperative
case (cfr. Section 3.1).
Quality stage We can now move to the quality stage. In order to identify the optimal
qualities, notice that the revenue of coalition fH;Lg is monotonically decreasing in vL, as
@


(fH;Lg;fMg)
H +
(fH;Lg;fMg)
L

@vL
=
1
4
v2M
(vH   vM )2
 
v2M + vHvL + 20vMvH   22vMvL
 
v2M + vHvL   4vHvM + 2vMvL
3 < 0:
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Accordingly, at the quality stage for colluding rms H and L it is protable to set vL = 0,
whatever the quality chosen by the intermediate rival M: The economic intuition underlying
this nding is that the low quality variant and the intermediate variant are strategic comple-
ments. So, if the merging rm increases vL; the independent rm producing vM would increase
its quality variant, thereby making tighter the competition with the top quality producer.29
Since the prot loss su¤ered by rm L when decreasing its quality level is lower than the gain
obtained by rm H (since the competition between vM and vH relaxes), the merging rms will
optimally set vL = 0 restricting their production only to the high quality variant vH .
As a result, from the rst-order conditions obtained maximizing, in turn, the prot of
coalition fH;Lg w.r.t to vH and the prot of rival M w.r.t vM , namely
@ (H +L)
@vH
=
 
vHv
3
M   64v4H + 48v3HvM + 16v3H   12v2Hv2M + 8vHv2M   12v2HvM

(4vH   vM )3
= 0
@M
@vM
=
 
v4M   12vHv3M   64v3HvM + 4v3H + 48v2Hv2M   7v2HvM

(4vH   vM )3
= 0
given that, at equilibrium v(fH;Lg;fMg)L = 0, we obtain the following equilibrium qualities, prices
and prots under CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg):
v
(fH;Lg;fMg)
H = 0:25331; v
(fH;Lg;fMg)
M = 0:04823; (27)
p
(fH;Lg;fMg)
H = 0:10766; p
(fH;Lg;fMg)
M = 0:01025; (28)
and

(fH;Lg;fMg)
fH;Lg = 0:02443; 
(fH;Lg;fMg)
M = 0:00152: (29)
Proposition 2 When the top and the bottom quality rm merge whereas the intermediate rm
remains singleton, namely under coalition structure CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg), at the quality
stage the low quality variant is set equal to zero. Prices and qualities o¤ered in equilibrium
coincide with those observed under CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg).
Proof. It directly follows by comparing expressions (24) and (25) with (27) and (28).
29See also Scarpa (1998), p. 669 for the same e¤ect in a three-rm noncooperative setting.
20
It is worth noting that from a market structure viewpoint, the formation of coalition struc-
tures CH;ML and CHL;M are equivalent, as both of them entail a duopoly structure with the
same quality gap between variants. Still, the rationale underlying the equilibrium congura-
tion in coalition CH;ML cannot be extended to CHL;M . In the former case, namely when the
intermediate and bottom quality rm compete against the top quality one, the colluding rms
decide to set a price so high for the bottom variant that no consumer is willing to buy it,
whatever its quality. So, this nding would be observed even if rms would unable to dene
endogenously the quality of their products. This is the case, for instance, in a collusive agree-
ment between an intermediate and a bottom quality producer, where rms have no reason
to maintain a ghting brand. Variant vL is adjacent only to variant vM and, if kept in the
market, would reap consumers only to the other colluding player without playing any role in
the competition against the top quality rm. Rather, in the latter scenario top and bottom
quality rms can decide to reduce the bottom quality to such an extent that the corresponding
market share for this variant turns out to be nil. When the coalition decides to withdraw vari-
ant vL from the market, it takes into account two di¤erent e¤ects. On one hand, since the low
quality variant is adjacent to the intermediate variant, ceteris paribus, increasing its quality
can enable the coalition to gain market share from the competitor producing variant vM and,
thus, to benet from the higher prots obtained by the bottom quality rm. On other hand,
as these two variants vM and vL are strategic complements, the higher quality of the bottom
quality variant boosts the quality of the intermediate variant. The latter variant is, in turn,
in direct competition with the top variant: since the lower the quality gap, the ercer price
competition between players, the higher the intermediate quality, the lower, ceteris paribus,
will be the prot accruing to the top quality rm. Since the loss for this player when the low
quality is produced is higher than the gain obtained by the bottom producer, coalition fH;Lg
will stop producing this variant.
3.4.3 Partial merger between the top and the intermediate quality rm
We nally characterize the equilibrium conguration when the top and the intermediate quality
rm decide to merge, with the bottom quality rival playing as singleton.
Price stage At the price stage, rms top and intermediate quality rms maximize the sum of
their own prots, namely H +M , whereas the bottom quality rm is playing independently.
Using (6), (16) and (23), the optimal replies under coalition structure CHM;L = (fH;Mg ; fLg)
are obtained, respectively, as
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ppcH (pM ) = pM +
1
2
(vH   vM )
ppcM (pL; pH) =
1
2pL(vH   vM ) + pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL)
ppcL (pM ) =
1
2
vL
vM
pM .
Thus, the last stage equilibrium prices can be easily found as:
p
((fH;Mg;fLg))
H (vH ; vM ; vL) =
(4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM )
2 (4vM   vL) ;
p
((fH;Mg;fLg))
M (vH ; vM ; vL) =
2vM (vM   vL)
4vM   vL ;
p
((fH;Mg;fLg))
L (vH ; vM ; vL) =
vL (vM   vL)
4vM   vL ;
with corresponding prots,

((fH;Mg;fLg))
H =
1
4
(4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM )
(4vM   vL)  
1
2
v2H ;

((fH;Mg;fLg))
M =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2M ;

((fH;Mg;fLg))
L =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2L.
Quality stage We saw above that, at the price stage, when the coalition structure C12;3 =
(f1; 2g ; f3g) forms, no variant is withdrawn from the market. Still, at the quality stage, it can
be proved that a case of quality reversal occurs. This is done in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 In order to escape from the cannibalization taking place between adjacent vari-
ants, merging top and intermediate quality rms enhance maximal di¤erentiation between their
products by putting the intermediate quality at the bottom of the quality ladder. The rival
L "leapfrogs" the intermediate quality rm, thereby producing a variant which lies now in the
middle of the quality ladder.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that now, prot ((fH;Mg;fLg))L coincides with that obtained by rmM when produc-
ing variant vM in coalition structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), namely ((fHg;fM;Lg))M . Thus,
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the variant produced by the merging rms coincide now with those produced under coalition
structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) where intermediate and bottom quality rms were collud-
ing. Moreover, in CHM;L = ((fH;Mg ; fLg)) the independent rm produces now the variant
that in the the previous scenarios was sold by the intermediate quality rm. In line with the
analysis performed in the previous case, the optimal variants are immediately obtained here
as:
v
(fH;Mg;fLg)
H = 0:25331; v
(fH;Mg;fLg)
M = 0 v
(fH;Mg;fLg)
L = 0:04823; (30)
while the equilibrium prots write as:

(fH;Mg;fLg)
fH;Mg = 0:02443;

(fH;Mg;fLg)
L = 0:00152:
(31)
Thus, one can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When the top and intermediate quality rms merge whereas the bottom quality
rm remains as singleton, namely under coalition structure CHM;L = ((fH;Mg ; fLg)), at the
quality stage the rm initially producing the bottom quality rm leapfrogs the adjacent rival
whose variant is no longer on sale in the market. The obtained qualities coincide with those
occurring under the alternative coalition structures CH;ML = ((fHg ; fM;Lg)) and CHL;M =
(fH;Lg ; fMg).
Proof. This follows directly by Proposition 3 and by the comparison of (27), (24) and
(30).
For ease of exposition, we summarize in the following table the payo¤s accruing to each
rm or coalition in each feasible coalition structure.
(fHg ; fMg ; fLg) H = 0:02348 M = 0:00124 L = 0:00005
fNg fNg(fH;M;Lg) = 0:03125
(fHg ; fM;Lg) (fHg;fM;Lg)H = 0:02443 (fHg;fM;Lg)fM;Lg = 0:00152
(fH;Lg ; fMg) (fH;Lg;fMg)fH;Lg = 0:02443 
(fH;Lg;fMg)
M = 0:00152
(fH;Mg ; fLg) (fH;Mg;fLg)fH;Mg = 0:02443 
(fH;Mg;fLg)
L = 0:00152
Table 1 - Firm payo¤s in every coalition structure.
It is worth remarking that the market structure (duopoly) arising in all partial mergers
does not vary with the coalition structure induced by the rms. Still, the prots accruing to
rms depend on the coalitions to (against) which they belong (compete).
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4 Equilibrium Analysis: Alliance Structures
4.1 The protability and cooperative stability of the grand coalition
Table 1 shows that, in terms of total payo¤s, the grand coalition of rms, i.e. the merger giving
rise to the whole market monopoly is, not surprisingly, the most protable coalition structure
obtainable in the vertical di¤erentiated market. Before starting the analysis of the stability of
coalition structures in the sequential game, we may wonder whether the grand coalition is, in
general, robust against coalitional deviations. More specically, we wonder whether there are
feasible allocations of the monopoly prot belonging to the core of the transferable utility game
associated to our simple model. An accurate analysis shows that the answer to this question
crucially depends on the initial assumptions of the game. In particular, if the players (rms)
are assumed ex ante identical and (contrarily to our case) there is not any pre-assigned level
of quality among them when the negotiation starts, the core of the corresponding cooperative
game in partition function form, turns out to be empty. Even worse than this, no other
intermediate coalition structure is stable even against individual deviations.
4.1.1 The core is empty with ex ante identical rms
The emptiness of the core with ex ante identical rms can be easily shown as follows: it
is natural to think that three ex ante identical rms i = 1; 2; 3 would equally divide the
monopoly prot obtained producing only the top quality good, thus obtaining i = 
fNg
3 =
0:03125
3 = 0:0104. In this case, at least one of them could decide to break the agreement
and start producing alone variant vH , thus obtaining 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H = 0:02443 if the remaining
rms jointly produce in response the intermediate quality variant (and a duopoly forms);30
alternatively, if the remaining rms split up into singletons and a triopoly forms, the rm
leaving the merger would obtain (fHg;fMg;fLg)H = 0:02348. In both cases the deviation is
protable and the e¢ cient equally-split monopoly payo¤ is not su¢ cient to prevent that at
least one of the rms breaks the cooperative agreement to become the top-quality producer.
Analogously, all partial mergers are unstable. In fact, inside every partial merger fi; jg jointly
selling either H or M against an independent rival, at least one of the two rms could always
30 Inside the monopoly at least one of the three rms are producing the top quality good. Therefore, this
rm could decide to produce it alone. The core is rather silent on the behaviour of players inside or outside
the cooperative agreement. In line with the literature on endogenous coalition formation, we presume here a
Nash behaviour for all coalitions after the breakdown of the grand coalition. Note however that, if the core is
empty under a Nash behaviour, it must be so also under minmax or maxmin behaviour of remaining players
after coalition deviations from the grand coalition.
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try to break the agreement and selling, independently, either H or M . Thus, since an ex
ante identical rm i in a partial merger receives either (fi;jgfhg)fi;jg =2 = 0:0122 when the merger
producesH or (fhg;fijg)fi;jg =2 = 0:00076 when it producesM , these payo¤s are largely dominated,
respectively, by (fig;fjg;fhg)H = 0:02348 and 
(fig;fjg;fhg)
M = 0:00124. The same result would
arise in a sequential bargaining protocol, since the rst rm along the sequence would always
announce its willingness to remain singleton to produce vH , the second to remain singleton
to produce vM and the third, similarly, would remain alone producing vL. As a result, in
a vertically di¤erentiated market in which rms are ex ante identical and free to select their
qualities and prices in a two-stage market game, any negotiation would always yields a coalition
structure in which all rms remain independent. This outcome, by the way, it is the starting
point of our coalition formation game. Before any merger can take place, rms are characterized
by pre-assigned quality levels, due to their previous history: say, they are either Volkswagen
or Skoda. However, as in our model, once entered an alliance, they can jointly adjust their
quality-price combinations.
4.1.2 The core is nonempty with ex ante heterogeneous rms
If rms are assumed, as in our game, ex ante heterogeneous, since at the beginning they produce
noncooperatively three di¤erent variants, it can be proved that the core is nonempty. This
is because now the monopoly prot can be allocated asymmetrically according to the initial
identities (and outside options) of the players, i.e., H, M and L. Formally, we can associate
to the vertically di¤erentiated market a partition function game  = (N; v (S;C(S))), where
N is the set of rms and v(S;C(S)) 2 R is the worth associated to every coalition of rms
S  N embedded in a given coalition structure C 2 C of which S is part. In our model, when
an alliance S  N forms, its maximal payo¤ obtains when the remaining rms stick together
in the complementary coalition fNnSg.31 Therefore, if the core of the partition function game
 exists when every S  N is embedded in C = (fSg ; fNnSg), it will a fortiori exist in any
other coalition structure containing S. Let us formally state this result.
Denition 3 The core of the partition function game  = (N; v (S;C)) consists of all e¢ cient
prot allocations  2 RjN j+ such that
P
k2S i  v (S;C(S)) for all S  N and for all C(S) in
31With only three rms, the behaviour outside a coalition S matters only for S = fig, i.e. when an individual
rm i is competing with the remaining rms in Nn fig, which, in turn, can either stay together, or paly as
singletons. Moreover, from Section 3 we know that whenever two rms form a coalition they eliminate one of
the variant either at the quality or at the price stage. Therefore, a rm playing as singleton prefers that its
competitiors merge rather than compete independently in the market: in game-theoretic terms there are positive
coalition externalities (see, for instance, Yi, 1997 and 2003).
25
which S can be embedded.
Thus, we can prove the following result.
Proposition 5 In the three-rm vertically di¤erentiated market with ex ante heterogeneous
rms H, M , L and endogenous qualities and prices, the core of the corresponding partition
function game  = (N; v (S;C)) is nonempty.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above result simply says that in a vertical di¤erentiated market with three rms ini-
tially competing noncooperatively in prices and qualities, there would always be room for
cooperative agreements between them. This is because, starting from their initial outside op-
tions (in turn, H , M and L), there exist divisions of the monopoly payo¤ that cannot be
improved upon by any coalition of rms, which includes their departure as singletons. The
grand coalition of rms would also be the outcome of an innite-horizon sequential coalition
formation game with ex ante heterogeneous players, where for a su¢ ciently high discount rate
there would always be room for cooperation.32 However, as we show in the next section, if
the bargaining process is sequential and in each period the rms possess only a nite set of
possibilities to propose coalitions and divisions of the joint prot to the rivals and if the game
possesses a nite-horizon, the grand coalition cannot be enforced in equilibrium.33 In partic-
ular, we show that only intermediate coalition structures (partial mergers) can be sustained
as subgame perfect equilibria of the alliance formation game. The study of which, among all
feasible partial mergers, are more likely to ariese in the three-rm negotiation, it is the purpose
of the next section.
4.2 Stable Alliances Structures
In this section we characterize the equilibria of the sequential game of alliance formation. Since
this game is sensitive to the identity of the initial player, we consider, in turn, the outcomes
obtained by the game when either rm H, M and L starts the bargaining process. Let us rst
32 In Bloch (1996) it is proved that if a coalition structure is core-stable it can also be sustained as a subgame
perfect equilibria of the innite-horizon sequential game of coalition formation (with a xed allocation rule).
33 In the real world there is also an additional, reason why the grand coalition is unfeasible: anti-trust author-
ities would always prevent a monopoly to form. This somehow justies the great deal of attention we devote to
the stability of partial agreements among rms.
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consider the case in which the rm producing the top-quality good (rm H ) is the initiator of
the coalition formation game.
It can be proved the following:
Proposition 6 When rm H is the initiator of the sequential alliance formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), where rm H continues to produce
variant vH and the two remaining rms M and L only market variant vM .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Applying the same rationale as above, in the next proposition, we can easily show that,
when rmM is the initial player, CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg) is the only stable coalition structure.
Proposition 7 When rm M is the initiator of the sequential alliance formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg), where rm H and L jointly produce
variant vH and rm M produces variant vM .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that, in both cases the initiator of the game is never part of an alliance in equi-
librium. Indeed, as shown in detail in the proofs of Proposition 6 and 7, the payo¤ of a rm
when remaining singleton (and rationally expecting that the other rms will prefer to merge)
dominates that of being part of the grand coalition, since in this case the distribution of prots
will be unfavourable for the initial proposer. The equilibrium prot accruing to either rm
H or M when initiating the game and competing against an alliance is, therefore, larger than
when they are part of the alliance itself. The optimal strategy is, therefore, to induce the
remaining rms to merge.
A di¤erent result arises when rm L (the bottom quality one) begins the negotiation
process. The reason is that, in this case, rm L cannot credibly commit to remain independent
when the remaining rms (H andM) prefer to play as singletons rather than forming an alliance
(see Table 1). This is due to the fact that the alliance between rm H and M is problematic
because in this circumstance M optimally leapfrogs the bottom quality rm, and ends up
sharing the top quality rm duopoly payo¤, which is lower than the sum of their prots under
triopoly (cf. section 3.4.3). Knowing in advance the infeasibility of coalition fH;Mg, rm L
will prefer to let rm H playing independently, and form an alliance with rm M . This is
shown in the next proposition.
27
Proposition 8 When rm L is the initiator of the sequential alliance formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), where rm H produces variant vH
and M and L jointly produce variant vM .
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is worth noting that if the game initiator would be selected at random, the most
likely outcome of the alliance formation game would be that in which the coalition structure
CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) forms, the other possible outcome implying the formation of CHL;M =
(fH;Lg ; fMg). Moreover, although at equilibrium the same coalition structure CH;ML forms
both when either rm H or L starts the negotiation, there is a di¤erence in term of rent extrac-
tion, in the two cases, for colluding rmsM and L: when rm H is the one starting the negoti-
ation, rmM in alliance fM;Lg only receives its outside option M = M = 0:00124, whereas
rm L is able to get a prot (fHg;fM;Lg)L = 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
fM;Lg  M = 0:00027 > L, exploiting its
last-mover advantage in the sequential game. When, on the other hand, it is rm L to start the
game, rm M in alliance fM;Lg receives (fHg;fM;Lg)M  L = 0:00147 > M = 0:00124, while
rm L only receives its noncooperative payo¤ L = 0:00005. In both cases, rm H receives
its duopoly payo¤ H = 0:02443.
Quite surprisingly, in the alliance formation game rm M enjoys a rst-mover advantage,
just because, when it starts the negotiation, it is able to enforce CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg)
extracting a prot of (fH;Lg;fMg)M = 0:00152 higher than in all other cases. Moreover, this
comes at expense of rmH, which in coalition structure CHL;M only receives its noncooperative
payo¤ H = 0:02348.
Finally, it can be noticed that, since for any order of play our one-shot coalition formation
game always sustains only one equilibrium alliance structure, the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the nite repeated version of the game will generate the same outcome period after period.
We condense this conclusion in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 If the alliance formation game is repeated for a nite number of periods, the
coalition structures which are stable in the one-shot game will continue to be so in the nite-
horizon repeated version of the game, sustained by the same SPE strategy prole repeated at
each period.
Therefore, even in a repeated nite-horizon framework, the stability of CH;ML and CHL;M
would continue to hold.
28
The results of our coalition formation game, conrms that the most likely type of merger
is the one occurring between intermediate and bottom-quality producers, with the premium
quality brands preferably running alone. This is the case, for instance, of some top car producer
as Daimler-Benz, whose only participation was in the production of Smart, initially started as
a joint venture with Nicolas Hayek, the inventor (and producer) of Swatch. What the stylized
results of our model indicate, is that the mergers between intermediate and bottom quality
rms, as those occurring between Volkswagen and Skoda, or between Fiat and Chrysler in the
automotive industry, should be the norm. In these cases the intermediate quality product is
withdrawn from the market, which can be interpreted by saying that of all products sold by
the merger possess a tendency to converge towards the level of quality of their premium brand
products. Our model also highlights how the mergers between top and bottom quality rms
are also likely as, for instance, those occurring between generics manufacturers and premium
brand pharmaceutical companies. In this case we see how the low quality products can be
protably withdrawn from the market, in order to soften the existing competition among
remaining goods.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the endogenous formation of mergers in vertically di¤erentiated markets
in which full or partial binding agreements among initially heterogenous rms can be signed
over prices and qualities of the products. We have shown that despite of the protability of the
full collusive agreement (i.e. the one signed by all rms in the market), such an arrangement
is not obtained in a (nite horizon) sequential negotiation process requiring the unanimity
of rms. Conversely, we found that the sequential bargaining process enforces only partial
collusive agreements, namely those involving subsets of rms. In particular, stable associations
of rms always include the rm producing the bottom quality variant, which is, however,
never sold by the coalition at equilibrium. Further, whatever the coalition structure arising
at the equilibrium, the market moves from a triopoly to a duopoly with only two variants on
sale. The rationale underlying this result can be found in the nature of competition among
vertically di¤erentiated rms. Indeed, in a partial merger, the optimal set of products to market
is dened by balancing the cannibalization e¤ect within the coalition and the stealing e¤ect
occurring between the coalition and the rm outside. When the bottom quality is kept for
sale in the market under a collusive agreement, the former e¤ect always dominates the latter.
As immediate consequence, this variant is withdrawn from the market and the equilibrium
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conguration coincides with that observed in the case of a duopoly in terms of price and
quality gap between variants. In a complementary perspective, we can state that moving from
a triopoly (observed in the noncooperative scenario) to a duopoly under partial collusion, rms
can soften price competition in the market and magnify the quality di¤erentiation between
the variants kept on sale. This view is in line with the empirical ndings, where mergers
emphasize "product di¤erentiation" among merging rms and also with respect to the rivals.
Partial mergers are, thus, as a means to enhance dynamic competition for the market, while
decreasing static competition in the market.
6 Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3. In order to escape from the cannibalization taking place between adjacent
variants, merging top and intermediate quality rms enhance maximal di¤erentiation between
their products by putting the intermediate quality at the bottom of the quality ladder. The
rival L "leapfrogs" the intermediate quality rm, thereby producing a variant which lies now
in the middle of the quality ladder.
Proof. At the quality stage, rmsprots are:

(fH;Mg;fLg)
H =
1
4
(4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM )
(4vM   vL)  
1
2
v2H

(fH;Mg;fLg)
M =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2M

(fH;Mg;fLg)
L =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2L
It is easy to see that, the joint prot of mergerfH;Mg is monotonically decreasing in vM , as
@


(fH;Mg;fLg)
H +
(fH;Mg;fLg)
M

@vM
=
(4v3LvM+v
3
L 48v2Lv2M+20v2LvM+192vLv3M 256v4M)
4(vL 4vM )3 < 0:
Thus, the merging rms nd it protable to set the quality of the intermediate variant at the
minimum admissible value, say 0: By doing this, they choose to produce a variant which is at
the bottom of the quality ladder. If the competitor L would keep its own variant at the same
quality level; then it would obtain nil prots. Rather, choosing to produce an intermediate
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variant vM > 0 would yield positive equilibrium prots equal to

(fH;Mg;fLg)
L =
v2M (vH   vL) (vM   vL) (vH   vM ) 
v2M + vHvL   4vHvM + 2vMvL
2 > 0 :
As this prot (fH;Mg;fLg)L is strictly positive for any vH > vM > vL = 0, one can conclude
that rm L nds it protable to leapfrog rival M .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. In the three-rm vertically di¤erentiated market with ex ante heterogeneous
rms and endogenous qualities and prices, the core of the partition function game  = (N; v (S;C))
is nonempty
Proof. Core allocations are individually-rational and group-rational prot division  =
(H ;M ;L) of the e¢ cient monopoly payo¤ v(N) = fNg = 0:03125. Thus, the set of  2
Core() must respect the following inequalities:
P
i=H;M;L
i = v(N) = 
fNg = 0:03125;
H +M  v (fH;Mg ; (fH;Mg ; fLg)) = (fH;Mg;fLg)fH;Mg = 0:02443
H +L  v (fH;Lg ; (fH;Lg ; fMg)) = (fH;LgfMg)fH;Mg = 0:02443
M +L  v (fM;Lg ; (fHg ; fM;Lg)) = ((H);fM;Lg)fH;Mg = 0:00152
H  v (fHg ; (fHg ; fM;Lg)) = ((H);fM;Lg)H = 0:02443
M  v (fMg ; (fH;Lg ; fMg)) = (fH;LgfMg)M = 0:00152
L  v (fLg ; (fH;Mg ; fLg)) = (fH;Mg;fLg)L = 0:00152
which surely hold, since:
0:02443 + 0:00152 + 0:00152 = 0:02749 < 0:03125:
Note that for every i-th rm, v (fig ; (fig ; fNn figg)) > v (fig ; (fig ; fjg ; fhg)) for every j; h 2
Nn fig, implying that each rm gains more when the remaining rms form a coalition than
when playing alone. Thus, the last numerical inequality holds a fortiori when, after one rm
leaves the grand coalition, the remaining rms split-up in singletons. As a result, all e¢ cient
payo¤allocations  = (H ;M ;L) rewarding every rm at least its maximal deviating payo¤
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and distributing the remaining surplus Z between the three rms, namely,
Z = fNg  ((H);fM;Lg)H  (fH;LgfMg)M  (fH;Mg;fLg)L = 0:0085
belong to the core, which is, therefore, nonempty.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 6. When rm H is the initiator of the sequential alliance formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), where rm H continues to produce
variant vH and the two remaining rms M and L only market variant vM .
Proof. The game can be solved backward. Firms H available actions at the initial node
(information set I1H 2 IH) are the following (proposals):
AH(I
1
H) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Mg ;) ; (fH;Lg ;) ; (fHg)] :
Assume rst that rm H proposes the grand coalition fNg associated to a given division
 2 fNg of the e¢ cient monopoly prot between the three rms. By the order of the game,
rm M can either accept or reject. If it rejects the o¤er, it is its turn to make a proposal and
can propose one of the following:
AM (I
1
M ) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Mg ;) ; (fM;Lg ;) ; (fMg)] :
We know (from Table 1) that, for any associated payo¤ division, the coalition structure
CHM;L = (fH;Mg ; fLg) is dominated by the choice of rm H and M to play as singletons,
since

(fH;Mg;fLg)
fH;Mg < 

H +

M :
Therefore, when made by rm M , the proposal pHMM = (fH;Mg ;) will always be rejected
by rm H. In this event, rm H has no more proposals to make. Thus, rm L can gain
its highest payo¤ by proposing fNg, o¤ering the noncooperative prots to H and M and get
the di¤erence fNg   H   M , which is its most protable outcome. To break the ties, we
can initially assume that, when gaining equal payo¤s all rms prefer being in a coalition than
remaining singletons (although the reasoning can be repeated when the alternative case holds).
A similar outcome would be reached if, after a rejection, rm M proposes pMLM = (fM;Lg ;)
or pNM = (fNg ;) which, in turn, would be both refused by rm L, aiming to propose (as
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last proposer) the grand coalition, obtaining L = fNg  H  M . Analogously, if rm M
accepts to enter the grand coalition when proposed by rm H, it knows that, when it is its
turn to play, rm L will always reject such proposal to propose, in turn, the grand coalition
with a payo¤ allocation which assigns to its rivals their Nash equilibrium payo¤s. Reasoning
backward, rm H knows that, if it proposes the grand coalition, it would obtain at most its
Nash equilibrium payo¤. For this reason, rm H can try to make alternative o¤ers. Proposing
pHMH = (fH;Mg ;) is out of question, since player M would always reject it, and the game
would return to the situation described above. Another chance for rm H is to propose
pHLH = (fH;Lg ;) that, in turn, would be rejected by rm L with the aim to propose again
(fH;Lg ;), o¤ering to rm H its noncooperative outside option. Alternative proposals by
rm L (after its rejection of fH;Lg proposed by rm H) involving rm M , as pNL = ffNg ;g
or pMLL = ffM;Lg ;g would similarly be rejected by rm M to enforce, as last proposer, the
grand coalition payo¤. Thus, at the initial node the most protable action for rm H is to
propose pHH = fHg, signalling the intention to play irrevocably as singleton. By doing this, it
is aware that rm M can either propose pMLM = (fM;Lg ;) or pM = (fMg). In the rst case,
rm M knows that rm L will reject to propose, in turn, pMLL = (fM;Lg ;), o¤ering M to
rm M and keeping the di¤erence, since: (fHgfM;Lg)fMLg  M > L. In the second case, namely
when rm M proposes pMM = fMg, a triopoly arises and rm M obtains M . Since with equal
payo¤s rms prefer by assumption to be in a coalition rather than remaining as singletons,
in this subgame the choice of rm M will be pMLM = (fM;Lg ;). Therefore, the coalition
structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) is stable because can be sustained by the following SPE
strategy prole along the equilibrium path:34
 =

H = fHg ; M =

fM;Lg ;0

; L =

No, fM;Lg ;00

;
where 0 = (0M ;
0
L), for 
0
M = 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
fMLg   L;L, 0L = L; and 
00
=


00
M ;
00
L

,
for 
00
M = 

M and 
00
L = 
(fHgfM;Lg)
ML   M . If we assume, to break ties, that with equal
payo¤s rms prefer to be singletons rather than being in coalition, the same coalition structure
CH;ML can be enforced by a SPE of the coalition formation game with the di¤erence that,
along the equilibrium path, 0M = 
(fHgfM;Lg)
fMLg   (L + ), 0L = L +  and 
00
M = 

M + ,

00
L = 
(fHgfM;Lg)
fMLg   (M + ), for  > 0. The same occurs in all other proposals implying the
presence of a coalition. The reason is that to convince a rm to join an alliance it must receive
34We have verbally described all out of equilibrium path actions which compose the SPE strategy prole 
and, therefore, for ease of simplicity, we do not repeat it here.
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something more (an  > 0) than its noncooperative payo¤. Therefore, coalition structure
CH;ML remains stable (namely supported by a SPE strategy prole of the sequential coalition
formation game) for every adopted rule to break ties. Finally, to see that CH;ML is the
only stable coalition structure arising when rm H is the initiator of the game, note that
any alternative strategy prole cannot be SPE just because rm H possesses an incentive
to protably deviate by proposing pH = fHg with the expectation to compete in a duopoly
(namely under CH;ML) and gaining a payo¤
((H);(ML))
H = 0:02443 which dominates its triopoly
prot H = 0:02348 (or in turn, 

H + ).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7. When rm M is the initiator of the sequential game of coalition formation,
the only stable coalition structure is CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg).
Proof. As above, the game can be solved backward. Firms M available actions at the
initial node (information set I1M 2 IM ) are:
AM (I
1
M ) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Mg ;) ; (fM;Lg ;) ; (fMg)] :
Again, if rmM proposes the grand coalition fNg, with an associated division of the monopoly
prot  2 fNg, the next player, rm H, would reject the o¤er to propose, in turn, one of the
following:
AH(I
1
1 ) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Mg ;) ; (fH;Lg ;) ; (fHg)] :
Coalition structure CHM;L = (fH;Mg ; fLg) is dominated by the choice of rm H and M to
play as singletons and proposal pHMH = (fH;Mg ;) is, therefore, rejected by rm M . If this
occurs, rm M has no more proposals and, hence, rm L can propose fNg, obtaining L =
fNg   H   M , which is its most protable outcome. Similar outcome would be reached
if, after a rejection, rm H o¤ers, in turn, pHLH = (fH;Lg ;) or pNH = (fNg ;), which can
either be accepted or refused by rm M , but nevertheless the nal payo¤ would, for rm H
and M , be their noncooperative outside options. Thus, reasoning backward, rm M knows
that by proposing the grand coalition it would receive at most its noncooperative payo¤. Its
alternative proposals are pHMM = (fH;Mg ;) which would be rejected by rm H (so the
game would reach the same outcome described above) or pMLM = ffM;Lg ;g which, in turn,
would be rejected by rm L with the aim to propose pL = ffM;Lg ;g, o¤ering rm M its
noncooperative outside option, which turns out to be better than any other coalition containing
rm H that would, in fact, exploit its last mover advantage. Note that forming alliance fM;Lg
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would, for rm L, be better than any other proposal involving rm H, that could exploit its
last-mover advantage. Thus, at the initial node, the most protable action for rm M is to
propose pMM = fMg, with the knowledge that rm H prefers to be in coalition than playing
as singleton proposing pHLH = ffH;Lg ;g rather than pHH = fHg. Hence, the proposal pHLH
by rm H would be rejected by rm L, that can counter-o¤er, in turn, pHLL = ffH;Lg ;g,
giving H to rm H and keeping the di¤erence for itself, since 
(fH;LgfMg)
HL   H > L. As
a result, the coalition structure CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg) is stable since it can be sustained by
the following SPE strategy prole along the equilibrium path:35
 =

H =

fH;Lg ;0

; M = fMg ; L =

No, fH;Lg ;00

;
with 0 = (0H ;
0
L), where 
0
H = 
(fH;LgfMg)
fHLg  L and 0L = L and 
00
=


00
M ;
00
L

, where

00
H = 

H and 
00
L = 
(fH;LgfMg)
fHLg   H . As in the proof of Proposition 6, if, under equal
payo¤s, rms prefer to be singletons than being in a coalition, the coalition structure CHL;M
can be enforced as a SPE of the coalition formation game for, 0H = 
(fH;Lg;fMg)
fHLg   (L + ),
0L = 

L+ , 
00
H = 

H +  and 
00
L = 
(fH;Lg;fMg)
fHLg   (H + ), for  > 0; and, similarly for all
other proposal involving coalitions outside the equilibrium path. Finally, CHL;M is the only
stable coalition structure when rm M is the initiator of the coalition formation game just
because in any alternative strategy prole rm M would always prefer to propose pMM = fMg
and compete in a duopoly with a payo¤(fH;LgfMg)M = 0:00152 rather than getting its triopoly
prot M = 0:00124 (or in turn, 

M + ), which occurs in all other subgames.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Proposition 8. When rm L is the initiator of the sequential coalition formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is CML;H = (fM;Lg ; fHg).
Proof. Again in this proof we reason backward. Note that when rm L is the initiator
of the game, the line of reasoning is slightly di¤erent than in Proposition 6 and 7. Firms L
available actions at the initial node (information set I1L 2 IL) are:
AL(I
1
L) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Lg ;) ; (fM;Lg ;) ; (fLg)] :
To break ties assume initially that, with equal payo¤s, rms prefer to be in coalition rather
than act as singletons. Note rst that if rm L proposes pLL = fLg, the turn passes to
35Again, for simplicity, we skip the description of all playersout of equilibrium actions.
35
player H, who can either propose pHH = fHg, in which case the game ends with CH;M;L =
(fHg ; fMg ; fLg) or instead pHMH = (fH;Mg ;), which again forces the game to end with
CH;M;L = (fHg ; fMg ; fLg), since CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) is dominated by CH;M;L for both
rmH andM (see Table 1). So di¤erently from above, rm L is unable to enforce the formation
of its complementary coalition Nn fLg = fH;Mg by signalling its willingness to play alone
as singleton. Alternatively, if rm L proposes either pNL = (fNg ;) or pHLL = (fH;Lg ;)
it always induces the formation of coalition structure CH;ML with H = 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H , M =

(fHg;fM;Lg)
M  L and L = L. The reason is that, by the order of play, after both proposals
the turn passes to rm H whose optimal strategy is to reject the o¤er and to announce pHH =
fHg, thus inducing proposal pMLM = (fM;Lg ; ()) by rm M with M = (fHg;fM;Lg)M   L
and L = L, which rm L will accept. Finally, if rm L proposes at the beginning of the
game pMLL = (fM;Lg ;), for any prot distribution  rmM will reject it to propose, in turn,
pMLM = (fM;Lg ;), again o¤ering L = L to rm L that, in turn, will accept. Therefore,
since by assumption with equal payo¤s rms prefer to be in coalition, the game possesses as
unique outcome the intermediate coalition structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), which can be
sustained as a SPE strategy proles. Again, it can be easily checked that the game outcome
does not change if, to break ties, we assume that under equal payo¤s rms prefer to play as
singletons rather than being in coalitions.
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